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LAWS AND EMERGING ISSUES
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO SCHOOL OF LAW
I.	 INTRODUCTION
The riparian system was unsuited for the American West.
Water was needed for different uses, principally mining and
irrigation. Further, the scarcity of water in the West caused
economic users to demand a system of water allocation that
established fixed, quantifiable rights to water. The shifting,
correlative rights recognized by the riparian doctrine failed
to meet these utilitarian needs. Local communities developed
the prior appropriation doctrine -- "first in time, first in
right" -- which established vested property rights in senior
appropriators.	 The courts, and later Congress and the state
legislatures, acknowledged these local customs and incorporated
them into the case law and the statutes.'
Initially, western states with dual riparian and approp-
riation systems ("California" doctrine states) moved to the
appropriation doctrine as the sole basis for acquiring rights to
water. Today, faced with ever increasing demands to conserve
water and to recognize the instream values of water, most western
legislatures have taken steps to alter some of the basic elements
of the prior appropriation doctrine as it existed in its his-
toric form. The courts are also beginning to develop doctrines
that square the historic prior appropriation doctrine with con-
temporary needs.
The modern treatises are R. Clark, Waters and Water
Rights (Allen Smith Co.; 1967, with pocket parts) (seven-volume
El
treatise; comprehensive treatment of state and federal issues);
W. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States
(U.S. Department of Agriculture; 1971) (three volume treatise;
emphasis on state law including summaries of the laws of the
individual states). The standard casebooks are C. Meyers and
A. D. Tarlock, Water Resource Management (Foundation Press;
1980, 2d ed.); F. Trelease, Water Law (West Publishing Co.; 1979,
3rd ed.).
REJECTION OF THE RIPARIAN DOCTRINE
A. The Land Ownershio Recuirement 
Valid appropriations can be made by a non-riparian
landowner or by a person occupying public lands.
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
B. The Rule of Correlative Rights 
Deficits are not prorated in times of shortage;
rather, there is no balancing of interests and
any deficit is borne entirely by junior appropria-
tors. Irwin v. Phillips, supra.
C. The Watershed Limitation 
Water may be appropriated in one watershed, then
transported and used in another watershed. Coffin
v. Left Hand Ditch, 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
D. Adoption of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine 
1. The hybrid system, recognizing both riparian
and appropriative rights (the "California
doctrine"), has been adopted in the Pacific North-
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west and in states along the 100th Meridian: Calif.,
Oregon, and Washington; North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas.
2. The pure appropriation (or "Colorado doctrine")
states are Alaska and the Rocky Mountain
States: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
ELEMENTS OF THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE 
A. Diversion 
Water must be physically removed from the water-
course. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83
N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972); Fullerton v. State 
Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal.App.3d 590,
153 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1979). The diversion require-
ment is included in three state constitutions.
See, e.g., Idaho Dev't. of Parks v. Idaho Den't. 
of Water Administration, 94 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d
924 (1974); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. 
v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 197 Colo. 469,
594 P.2d 570 (1979).
• B. Beneficial Use 
Water cannot be validly appropriated unless it is
applied without waste to a beneficial use which,
under case law or statutes in most states, has been
defined as domestic use or commercial uses such as
mining, manufacturing, stock watering, and agriculture.
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See generally, Comment, Minimum Streamflows: The
Legislative Alternatives, 57 Neb.L.Rev. 704, 711-13
(1978). Thus, unless a statute expressly so pro-
vides, water cannot be appropriated to preserve
fish and wildlife or scenic values. Empire Water 
and Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123
(8th Cir. 1913).
C. Intent to Appropriate and Due Diligence
An appropriator may claim a priority date relating
back to the time work began if intent to approp-
riate and reasonable diligence are shown. Cit y and
County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Con-
servancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954).
IV.	 FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS AND THE APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE 
Many early appropriations in the West were made by miners
on the federal lands. In addition, federal patents were issued;
it was unclear when, if ever, federal patents would carry
riparian rights. Thus it became important to reconcile the
extent to which state or federal law governed the acquisition of
Private water rights on the public lands.
A. The Traditional Approach: Express Federal Statutory 
Deference to State Law
In 1866 Congress protected appropriations on public
lands from claims by the United States. 43, U.S.C.
Sec. 661. In 1870 Congress provided that any federal
patents would be subject to existing appropriations,
Hr
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ditches, and rights-of-way. Id. In 1877, The Desert
Lands Act provided that all water on non-navigable
watercourses on the public lands "shall remain and
be held free for the appropriation and use of the
public for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing
purposes subject to existing rights." 43 U.S.C. Sec.
321.	 The Supreme Court held that this provision
in the 1877 Act "severed" water rights from rights
to land. Thus as of 1877, "if not before," water
rights in non-navigable watercourses became "sub-
ject to the plenary control of the designated
states." California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).	 "Th
B. The Modern Approach: Lack of Federal Preemntion 
Reliance upon the 1866, 1870, and 1877 acts and upon
the California Oregon rationale fails to resolve
many questions. The Desert Lands Act of 1877
applies only in designated states and to non-
navigable watercourses. What rule applies in other
states and on navigable waterways? What rule applies
to appropriations before 1877? Before 1870 or 1866?
The best answer is that states are free to develop
their own rules, not because land and water rights
were "severed" in 1877, but because Congress never
preempted state law. Thus states have the preroga-
tive of recognizing either riparian or appropriative
rights on the public lands, no mater when acquired,
because there never has been a general federal law
to the contrary. See generally Klempe v. New
Mexico, 425 U.S. 529 (1976); United States v. 
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The exceptions
are those specific instances in which state law has
been preempted, the most notable examples being
Indian reserved rights.
C. Access Across Federal Lands for Water Works 
Rights-of-way are now governed primarily by the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
43 U.S.C. Sections 1761-71. See also 16 U.S.C.
Sections 478, 481 (access and use of waters in
national forests).
V.	 MODERN LEGACIES OF THE HISTORIC APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE 
State legislatures have moved on a number of fronts to
build upon the common law system of prior appropriation as
developed by the courts. Beginning with Wyoming in 1890, all
states have now established administrative agencies to issue
permits, enforce priorities, approve transfers, and designate
forfeitures. General stream adjudications are conducted in the
agencies or in court. Procedures for setting minimum stream
flows have been instituted in most states. Groundwater codes
have been enacted to fill the void left by the appropriation
doctrine, which dealt only with surface waters.
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In spite of the statutory reform, many of the basic
notions in the early cases remain alive and continue to influence
water law and policy. The following are examples of conceptual
issues that remain important to the practicing lawyer as doctrine
continues to evolve.
A. The Primacy of State Law 
The major decisions demonstrate that the Supreme
Court will presume deference to state water law unless
Congressional intent to the contrary is clearly ex-
pressed. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645
(1978) (Section 8 of Reclamation Act requires that
federal reclamation projects comply with state laws
concerning construction and operation); Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976) (McCarran Amendment allows suit
in state court for adjudication of Indian water
rights); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S.
696 (1978) (Forest Service Organic Act of 1897 did
not reserve water for aesthetic, recreational, or
wildlife preservation purposes).
B. Property Rights and Governmental Jurisdiction 
Historically water has been treated as property
belonging to the states. Future decisions may more
squarely recognize that the states do not "own"
the water; rather, the states have governmental
authority to regulate the use of water in the state.
A similar development has already occurred in the law
of wildlife -- also dealing with a moving resource
and competing governmental and private claims --
where 19th century formulations of "ownership"
have given way to a jurisdictional analysis. See
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), overruling
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
C. Permit Denial Based on the Public Interest 
Historically, water rights were obtained, whether by
local custom or by statute, simply by meeting the
requirements of a valid appropriation. There was no
mechanism for denial on the ground that the approp-
riation might be contrary to the public interest.
Recent statutes have included provisions for such a
denial. See Alaska Stat., 46.15.080; Robie, The
Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23
Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 917 (1977). The public
trust doctrine may also apply. United Plainsmen 
Ass'n. v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n.,
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); Johnson, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Western Water Law, 14 U.Cal-Davis L.Rev.
(1981).
D. Decreed Rights Based on Waste 
Large numbers of western irrigators have water rights
based on wasteful irrigation works. In many cases
those uses, including the waste, have been recognized
by court decrees. Because the rights are conceptualized
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as vested property rights, some courts have held
that the waste cannot be abated by later conserva-
tion legislation without causing a compensable
taking. Enterprise Irrigation District v. Willis,
135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 326 (1939). Allowing admin-
istrative officials and courts to order such waste
discontinued, however, would free up water for uses
such as instream flows and energy development.
A number of modern cases have moved to eliminate
waste on a variety of grounds. Wasted water has
been found not to be a beneficial use, In re Water 
Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 10 Utah2d
77, 348 P.2d 679, 681-82 (1960), or maximum utiliza- 	 M
tion of water. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States,
196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57, 60-61 (1978). Wasted
water has been held to be forfeited. State v. McLean,
62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983, 988-89 (1957). In Idaho,
waste through carriage loss is discouraged by measuring
water rights from the point of discussion, not the
place of use. Glenn Dale Ranches, Inc. v. Shaub,
94 Idaho 585, 494 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1975). The
transfer of wasted water has been denied. Basin
Electric Power Coop. v. State Board of Control, 578
P.2d 557, 569-70 (Wyo. 1978). Whatever specific
theories may be employed, it appears increasingly
likely that courts will proceed on the conceptual
basis that no vested rights are acquired in wasted
39
water and that appropriations of water based in
part on wasteful practices can be decreased over
time as new technologies become reasonable feas-
ible. See generally Note, Water Waste--Ascertain-
ment and Abatement, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 449.
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